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THE OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE 
PART I 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
(' 
November-December,1980 
-
The Ohio Rules of Evidence were promulgated 
by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitu-
tional rulemaking authority. See Ohio Canst. art. 
IV,§ 5(8). They became effective on July 1, 1980. 
The Rules of Evidence change Ohio law in a num-
ber of respects. Some of the more important 
changes in criminal cases include: 
Rule 801(D)(1)(b) permits prior consistent state-
ments to be used as substantive evidence if of-
fered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication. ..J 
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Opinion Evidence. Rules 405(A) and 608(A) per-
mit the use of opinion evidence to prove character. 
Prior law generally authorized only the use of repu-
tation evidence to prove character. 
Voucher Rule. Rule 607 abolishes the Ohio 
voucher rule, which prohibited a party from im-
peaching its own witness. There is, however, an 
important exception. Surprise and affirmative dam-
age are required before a party may impeach its 
own witness with a prior inconsistent statement. 
Prior Convictions. Rule 609(A) limits the types of 
convictions that may be used to impeach. No 
longer are all felony and misdemeanor convictions 
admissible. Ordinance violations, however, may be 
admissible. In addition, Rule 609(8) generally 
prohibits the impeachment use of convictions over 
ten years old. 
Refreshing Recollection. Rule 612 empowers the 
trial judge, under certain circumstances, to compel 
production of writings used prior to trial to refresh 
a witness' recolleciion. 
Hypothetical Questions. Rule 705 makes the use 
of the hypothetical question in eliciting expert 
opinion testimony optional. 
Prior Statements. Rule 801(D)(1)(a) changes Ohio 
law by permitting some types of prior inconsistent 
statements to be admitted for substantive, rather 
than impeachment, purposes. This exception is 
limited to prior statements given under oath, sub-
ject to penalty of perjury, and subject to cross-
examination at the time the statement was made. 
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman 
Res Gestae. The confusing and ambiguous term 
res gestae is not used in the Rules of Evidence. In 
many cases, so-called res gestae statements are 
not hearsay as defined in Rule 801(A)-(C). In other 
cases, such statements may fall within one of the 
enumerated hearsay exceptions: present sense im-
pressions, Rule 801(1); excited utterances, Rule 
803(2); or statements relating to presently existing 
mental or physical condition, Rule 803(3). 
Former Testimony. Rule 804(8)(1) excludes pre-
liminary hearing testimony from the former testi-
mony exception to the hearsay rule. 
Declarations Against Penal Interests. Rule 
804(8)(3) recognizes a hearsay exception for state-
ments against penal interests. If offered to excul-
pate or inculpate an accused, such statements 
must be corroborated. 
Best Evidence Rule. Rule 1003 makes dupli-
cates, as defined in Rule 1001, generally admis-
sible on the same basis as originals. 
This is the first in a series of articles examining 
the Rules of Evidence as they apply in criminal 
cases. 
BACKGROUND 
The Federal Rules of Evidence 
The Ohio Rules of Evidence are patterned after 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Consequently, an 
appreciation of the Federal Rules is necessary for 
understanding the Ohio Rules. The Federal Rules 
were promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
November 1972 and were transmitted to Congress 
in February 1973. See 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973). The fed-
eral drafjing committee had been appointed in 
1965 and had published drafts in 1969 and 1971. 
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See 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) (preliminary draft); 51 
F.R.D. 315 (1971) (revised draft). These drafts are 
important because in some instances the Ohio 
Rules of Evidence follow one of the drafts rather 
than the Federal Rules as enacted. E.g., Rule 403 
(exclusion of relevant evidence); Rule 611(B) (scope 
of cross-examination). 
Congress reacted to the Court-promulgated rules 
by enacting legislation that deferred the effective 
date of the Federal Rules, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 · 
Stat. 9 (1973), and extensive hearings on the Fed-
eral Rules were held during 1973-74. See Proposed 
Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special 
Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Gong., 1st 
Sess. (1973); Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings 
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 
93d Gong., 2d Sess. (1974). In 1975 the Federal 
Rules emerged from Congress in statutory form. 
Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). Congress 
amended the Court-promulgated rules in numerous 
respects. Perhaps the most significant change in-
volved the law of privilege. The Court had pro-
posed 13 specific rules on that subject; Congress 
deleted all, substituting a general provision which 
left the law of privilege undisturbed. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 501. In addition, Rule 609, which governs the 
impeachment use of prior convictions, was the 
subject of controversy and amendment. The legis-
lative history of these amendments is found in the 
various committee reports as well as in the Con-
gressional Record. See H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d 
Gong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [19741 U.S. 
Code Gong. & Ad. News 7075; S. Rep. No. 1277, 
93d Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. code 
Gong. & Ad. News 7051; H.R. Rep. No. 1597, 93d 
Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code 
Gong. & Ad. News 7098 (conference report). These 
reports are valuable resources for interpreting the 
Ohio as well as Federal Rules of Evidence. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence have had a sub-
stantial impact on the state level. They have been 
adopted with various amendments in twenty-two 
jurisdictions and are being considered for adoption 
in half-a-dozen other states. Moreover, in 1974 the 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws revised the 
Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953) to conform to the 
Federal Rules. 
The Ohio Rules 
The drafting of the Ohio Rules of Evidence com-
menced in 1975 with the appointment of an Advis-
ory Committee. See O'Neill, Introduction, Sympo-
sium: The Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 Cap. U.L. Rev. 
515 (1977); Miller, The Game Plan: Drafting the 
Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 Cap. U.L. Rev. 549 
(1977). A draft of the Rules was published in 1976, 
see 49 Ohio Bar 929 (1976), and the Court promul-
gated the Rules for the first time in January 1977. 
See 50 Ohio Bar 231 (1977). 
The General Assembly, however, exercised its 
constitutional prerogative and disapproved the 
Rules. Disapproval was based on several concerns: 
(1) that the formulation of rules of evidence was a 
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legislative, rather than judicial, function; (2) that a 
number of rules were substantive, rather than pro-
cedural, and thus beyond the Court's rulemaking 
authority under section 5(B), article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution; (3) that the need for rules of evidence 
had not been demonstrated; and (4) that certain 
rules, particularly those recognizing the exercise of 
discretion by trial courts, were undesirable. For a 
discussion of this controversy, see Giannelli, The 
Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The General As-
sembly, Evidence, and Rulemaking, 29 Case W. 
Res. L Rev. 16 (1978); Walinski & Abramoff, The 
Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The Case 
Against, 28 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 344 (1978). 
The Rules were again proposed and disapproved 
in 1978. See 51 Ohio Bar 181 (1978). After substan-
tial amendments were made, the Rules were pro~ 
posed by the Court for a third time in 1980. In the 
absence of a resolution of disapproval, the Rules 
became effective in July 1980. 
References 
The Rules of Evidence, along with the Staff 
Notes and the Federal Advisory Committee's 
Notes, are contained in Ohio Rules of Evidence 
Handbook (P. Giannelli ed. 1980) (Banks-Baldwin 
Pub. Co.). In addition, several law review articles 
on the Rules have·been published. See Philipps, A 
Guide to the Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence, 5 
Ohio North. U.L. Rev. 28 (1978); Symposium, The 
Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 Cap. U. Rev. 515-634 
(1977). Care must be exercised in consulting these 
articles because they were written prior to the 
1980 amendments. 
A number of treatises on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence have been authored. The multi-volume 
references include: D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Fed-
eral Evidence (Lawyers Co-Operative Pub. Co.); J. 
Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 
(Matthew Bender); and 21 & 22 C. Wright & K. 
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure (West 
Pub. Co.). There is one single volume text: S. Saltz-
burg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Man-
ual (2d ed. 1977) (Michie Co.). 
RULE 101: SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY 
Rule 101 contains the applicability provision for 
the Rules of- Evidence. According to Rule 101(A), 
the Rules of Evidence apply in proceedings in all 
state courts and in all proceedings before court-
appointed referees unless an exception is recog-
nized. Rules 101(B) and (C) specify the exceptions. 
Court-appointed referees are rarely encountered 
in criminal practice. In juvenile cases, however, 
court-appointed referees are used frequently. The 
Rules of Evidence, however, may not always apply 
in proceedings before court-appointed referees be· 
cause Rule 101(C)(6) carves out an exception for 
"[p]roceedings in which other rules prescribed by 
the supreme court govern matters relating to evi-
dence." For example, Juvenile Rule 40(B) provides 
that a referee "may rule upon the admissibility of 
evidence unless otherwise directed by the order o1 
reference .... " Consequently, an order of refer-
ence may preclude a court-appointed referee from 
applying the Rules of Evidence. See Staff Note, 
Rule 101. 
Rule 101 makes no distinction between the ap-
plicability of the Rules of Evidence in civil and 
criminal cases. Nevertheless, a number of specific 
rules recognize such a distinction - for example, 
Rule 803(8) contains a special limitation on the use 
of public records in criminal cases and Rule 
804(8)(3) imposes a corroboration requirement on 
the use of declarations against penal interests in 
criminal cases. Similarly, a number of rules apply 
only in civil cases. E.g., Rule 407 (subsequent re-
medial measures); Rule 408 (compromises and of-
fers of compromise); Rule 411 (liability insurance). 
Moreover, the Rules of Evidence generally do 
not codify constitutional principles. Consequently, 
in criminal prosecutions the Rules of Evidence 
must be applied in light of constitutional provi-
sions which relate to evidentiary matters. For ex-
ample, the Confrontation Clause may require the 
exclusion of a hearsay statement, even if that 
statement falls within a hearsay exception recog-
nized in Rules 803 and 804. In California v. Green, 
399 U.S. 149 (1970), the U.S. Supreme Court com-
mented: "While it may readily be conceded that 
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Cl-ause are 
generally designed to protect similar values, it is 
quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap 
is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is 
nothing more or less than a codification of the 
rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they ex-
isted historically at common law." /d. at 155. 
Rule 101 also makes no distinction between the 
applicability of the Rules of Evidence in jury and 
bench trials. Nevertheless, evidentiary rules have 
not been applied in same manner in cases tried 
before a jury and cases tried before a judge. This 
does not mean that a trial judge is free to ignore 
the Rules of Evidence in a bench trial. It does 
mean, however, that appellate courts will not as 
readily find error in a bench trial. See State v. 
Eubanks, 60 OS(2d) 183, 187, 398 NE(2d) 561, 570 
(1980) ("[A] judge is presumed to consider only the 
relevant, material and competent evidence in arriv-
ing at a judgment, unless the contrary affirmatively 
appears from the record."); State v. White, 15 
OS(2d) 146, 151, 239 NE(2d) 65, 70 (1968). 
Exemptions 
Rule 101(C) specifies a number of exemptions to 
the applicability of the Rules of Evidence, a num-
ber of which apply in criminal proceedings. 
Grand Jury Proceedings. Rule 101(C)(2) exempts 
grand jury proceedings from the Rules of Evidence. 
The rationale for exempting grand jury proceedings 
is set forth in Costello v. United States, 350 US 359 
(1965). In that case the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the use of hearsay evidence in grand jury proceed-
ings. Applying the hearsay rule, according to the 
Court, "would run counter to the whole history of 
the grand jury institution, in which laymen conduct 
their inquiries unfettered by technical rules." 
!d. at 364. 
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Extradition and Rendition. Rule 101(C)(3) ex-
empts extradition and rendition proceedings from 
the Rules of Evidence. These proceedings are ex-
empted because they "are essentially administra-
tive in character. Traditionally the rules of evi-
dence have not applied." Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 1101. Extradition and rendition 
proceedings are governed by R.C. ch. 2963. They 
are also governed by federal law. Article 4, section 
2, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution reads: "A Per-
son charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or 
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice; and be 
found in another State, shall on Demand of the ex-
ecutive Authority of the State from which he fled, 
be delivered up, to be removed to the State having 
Jurisdiction of the Crime." This constitutional pro-
vision is enforced by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3182. 
Sentencing and Probation. Rule 101(C)(3) also ex-
empts sentencing and probation proceedings from 
the Rules of Evidence. "The rules of evidence have 
not been regarded as applicable to sentencing or 
probation proceedings, where great reliance is 
placed upon the presentence investigation and re-
port." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 
1101. Sentencing hearings are governed by Crim-
inal Rules 32 and 32.2 See also R.C. ch. 2929 
(Penalties and Sentencing); R.C. ch. 2967 (Proba-
tion). Revocation of probation is governed by Crim-
inal Rule 32.3. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has required probation revocation proceedings to 
satisfy due process standards. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
411 us 778 (1973). 
In contrast to probation, which is a judicial func-
tion, the granting and revoking of parole is an ex-
ecutive function and, therefore, is not governed by 
the Rules of Evidence because the regulation of 
executive department functions is beyond the Su-
preme Court's rulemaking authority. Parole is gov-
erned by R.C. ch. 2967 (Pardon and Parole) and 
R.C. ch. 5149 (Adult Parole Authority). In addition, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has required parole revoca-
tion hearings to satisfy due process standards. 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 US 471 (1972). See also 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Cor-
rectional Complex, 442 US 1 (1979) (parole release). 
Warrants and Summons. Rule 101(C)(3) also ex-
empts proceedings for the issuance of warrants 
and summons. "Warrants for arrest, criminal sum-
monses, and search warrants are issued upon 
complaint or affidavit showing probable cause .... 
The nature of the proceedings makes application 
of the formal rules of evidence inappropriate and 
impracticable." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. 
R. Evid. 1101. The issuance of arrest warrants and 
summons are governed by Criminal Rules 4 and 9; 
search warrants are governed by Criminal Rule 41. 
Release on Bail. Rule 101(C)(3) also exempts pro-
ceedings involving pretrial release from the Rules 
of Evidence. Release on bail or personal recogni-
zance is governed by Criminal Rule 46. Release on 
bail pending appeal is governed by Appellate 
Rule 8. Detention pending adjudication in juvenile 
cases is governed by Juvenile Rule 7. 
Contempt Proceedings. Rule 101(C)(4) exempts 
summary contempt proceedings from the Rules of 
Evidence. The Ohio Staff Note defines summary 
contempt as contempt "committed in the view or 
hearing of the court, but not when the contempt is 
committed other than in the actual presence of the 
court." In short, summary contempt involves direct 
contempt (in the presence of the court) as opposed 
to indirect contempt. 
Other Rules. Rule 101(C)(6) exempts from the 
Rules of Evidence proceedings in which other 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court govern evi-
dentiary matters. Consequently, if the Rules of Evi-
dence conflict with any other rule prescribed by 
the Supreme Court, the "other rule" controls. For 
example, Criminal Rule 47 authorizes the use of af-
fidavits in support of motions in criminal cases 
and Juvenile Rule 7(F)(3) provides that a court may 
consider any evidence in a detention hearing 
"without regard to formal rules of evidence." 
Privilege 
Rule 101(B) provides that the law of privilege ap-
plies "at all stages of all actions, cases, and pro-
ceedings conducted under these rules." Privileges 
are singled out for special treatment because dis-
closure of privileged information would defeat the 
policy reasons underlying the various rules of privi-
lege. Thus, even if one of the exceptions in Rule 
101(C) makes the Rules of Evidence inapplicable, 
the law of privilege nevertheless applies. 
There is one significant problem with Rule 
101(8). The drafters of the Rules of Evidence dis-
tinguished the spousal privilege relating to confi-
dential communications, R.C. 2317.02(0) & 2945.42, 
from the spousal testimonial privilege applicable 
in criminal cases, Rule 601(B). By treating the lat-
ter privilege as a rule of competence in Rule 
601(8), the drafters have produced an anomalous 
result. Apparently, Rule 601(B) would apply at trial 
but not at a grand jury hearing because grand jury 
hearings are exempted from the Rules of Evidence 
pursuant to Rule 101(C)(2) and Rule 601(B) is not a 
rule of privilege under Rule 101(B). 
RULE 102: PURPOSE AND CONSTRUCTION 
Rule 102 contains the purpose and construction 
clause for the Rules of Evidence. It reads: 
The purpose of these rules is to provide procedures 
for the adjudication of causes to the end that the 
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly de-
termined. These rules shall be construed to state the 
common law of Ohio unless the rule clearly indicates 
that a change is intended and shall not supersede 
substantive statutory provisions. 
Rule 102 differs from its federal counterpart in 
several respects. First, the introductory clause to 
Federal Rule 102 has been deleted; that clause 
provides that the Federal Rules shall be construed 
to secure the "promotion of growth and develop-
ment of the law of evidence." The deletion of this 
language can be traced directly to United States v. 
Batts, 558 F(2d) 513 (9th Cir. 1977), withdrawn, 573 
F(2d) 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 US 859 (,1978). 
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In Batts the Ninth Circuit held that a criminal de-
fendant could be impeached with extrinsic evi-
dence of prior conduct not resulting in a convic-
tion, even though Federal Rule 608(B) expressly 
prohibited the use of such extrinsic evidence. The 
court based its result, in part, on Federal Rule 102. 
Batts raised the spectre, according to critics, that 
a "trial judge [has] discretion to ignore a rule of 
evidence, even one that Congress chose to make 
mandatory, if he believes that the whole 'truth' as 
he perceived it, might not be served." Walinski and 
Abramoff, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: 
The Case Against, 28 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 344, 
369-70 (1978). See also Note, United States v. 
Batts: Aberration or Permissible Construction 
Under the Rules of Evidence?, 9 Toledo L. Rev. 464 
(1978). According to Staff Note, the language of 
Federal Rule 102 concerning "promotion of growth 
and development of the law of evidence" was de-
leted in order to avoid the expansive construction 
of Batts. 
Second, Rule 102 sets forth two rules of con-
struction not found in Federal Rule 102: (1) The 
Rules of Evidence are to be construed to state the 
common law of Ohio unless the rule clearly indi-
cates that a change in the common law is in-
tended, and (2) the Rules of Evidence are to be 
construed so as not to supersede substantive stat-
utory provisions. 
In determining whether the Rules were intended 
to change the common law, the Ohio Staff Notes 
should be consulted first. Most of the Staff Notes 
contain statements indicating whether a particular 
rule would change prior Ohio law. The legislative 
history of the Federal Rules - the Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes and the congressional committee 
reports - will also shed light on this issue, espe-
cially in those instances in which the federal and 
Ohio rule are identical. 
The reference to substantive statutory provisions 
in Rule 102 was intended to incorporate section 
5(B), article IV of the Ohio Constitution, which 
reads, in part: "The supreme court shall prescribe 
rules governing practice and procedure in all 
courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, 
enlarge, or modify any substantive right." As was 
noted above, this issue played a critical role in the 
General Assembly's disapproval of the Rules in 
1977 and 1978. The line between substance and 
procedure is a difficult one to draw and a detailed 
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of 
this article. See generally, Morgan, Rules of Evi-
dence - Substantive or Procedural?, 10 Vand. L. 
Rev. 467 (1957); Giannelli, The Proposed Ohio 
Rules of Evidence: The General Assembly, Evi-
dence, and Rulemaking, 29 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
16, 33-58 (1978). 
The Rules of Evidence, as finally adopted, con-
tain a compromise on this issue. A number of 
rules are considered substantive in nature and, in 
those instances, statutory enactments are not 
superseded by the Rules. For example, the rape 
shield statute, Rule 404(A), the law of privilege, 
Rule 501, and the impeachment of a witness by 
use of a prior juvenile adjudication, Rule 609(0), 
are considered substantive. All other rules are con-
sidered procedural and conflicting statutes are 
superseded. 
RULE 103: RULINGS ON EVIDENCE 
Rule 103 specifies the procedures relating to rul-
ings on evidentiary issues. It covers such matters 
as plain and harmless error, objections and offers 
of proof, and out-of-court hearings. 
Harmless Error 
Rule 103(A) provides that a case will not be re-
versed on appeal because of an erroneous eviden-
tiary ruling unless the ruling involves a "substan-
tial right" and the other procedural requirements 
of Rule 103, such'as a timely objection, have been 
satisfied. The term "substantial right" is not de-
fined in the rule, but the Staff Note clearly indi-
cates that the term refers to the harmless error 
doctrine. Criminal Rule 52(A) contains a provision 
on harmless error: "Any error, defect, irregularity, 
or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded." 
In criminal trials, errors involving federal consti-
tutional rights must be judged by the federal stan-
dard. Under this standard, the state must "prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error com-
plained of did not contribute to the verdict ob-
tained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967). See generally, 88 Moore's Federal Practice 
ch. 52 (1980); Field, Assessing the Harmlessn_ess 
of Federal Constitutional Error - A Process rn 
Need of a Rationale, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15 (1976); 
Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va. L. 
Rev. 988 (1973). 
The federal standard (beyond a reasonable 
doubt) established in Chapman has been adopted 
by the Ohio Supreme Court in reviewing nonconsti-
tutional error in criminal cases. In State v. Bayless, 
48 OS(2d) 73, 357 NE(2d) 1035 (1976), the Supreme 
Court wrote: 
Error in the admission of evidence in criminal pro· 
ceedings is harmless if there is no reasonable possi-
bility that the evidence may have contributed to the 
accused's conviction. In order to hold the error harm-
less, the court must be able to declare a belief that 
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(syllabus, para. 7). Accord, State v. Eubank, 60 OS(2d) 
183, 398 NE(2d) 567 (1980). 
Objections 
Rule 103(A)(1) requires an objection or motion to 
strike in order to preserve a challenge to the ad-
missibility of evidence. A failure to object or to 
move to strike is considered a waiver of the objec-
tion and the issue will not be reviewed on appeal. 
See State v. Gordon, 28 OS(2d) 45, 276 NE(2d) 243 
(1971); State v. Lancaster, 25 OS(2d) 83, 267 N E(2d) 
291 (1971). This rule, however, is subject to the 
plain error doctrine. Another consequence of fail-
ing to object is that the evidence becomes part of 
the record of trial and may be considered by the 
trier of fact, by the trial court in ruling on motions, 
and by a reviewing court. See Hastings v. Bonner, 
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578 F(2d) 136, 142-43 (5th Cir. 1978); United States 
v. Johnson, 577 F(2d) 1304, 1312 (5th Cir. 1978). 
Rule 103(A)(1) requires objections to be timely. If 
a question is improper, an objection should be 
made immediately. See Gates v. Dills, 13 App(2d) 
163, 164, 234 NE(2d) 604, 605 (1967) ("Ordinarily, an 
objection to incompetent and improper testimony 
must be made with reasonable promptness."). In 
some instances, however, it will not be apparent 
that a question will elicit an objectionable 
response. In such cases, a motion to strike is re-
quired. See Johnson v. English 5 App(2d) 109, 214 
NE(2d) 254 (1966). Jf a motion to strike is granted, 
the jury should be instructed to disregard the evi-
dence. See 4 Ohio Jury Instructions§ 405.10 (1974) 
(Provisional). "Timeliness" in some instances re-
quires that an objection be made prior to trial. For 
example, objections based on violations of consti-
tutional rights frequently must be made in the form 
of a pretrial motion to suppress. Criminal Rule 
12(8)(3) provides that "[m]otions to suppress evi-
dence, including but not limited to statemen.ts and 
identification testimony, on the ground that 1t was 
illegally obtained" must be raised prior to trial. 
Rule 103 requires specific, as opposed to gen-
eral, objections; that is, the grounds upon which 
the objection is based must accompany the objec-
tion unless the grounds are apparent from the con-
text. Statements such as "I object," "Objection, in-
admissible," and "Objection, il'lcompetent" are 
general objections. Objection on the ground that 
evidence is "incompetent, irrelevant, and immate-
rial" is also considered a general objection. See C. 
McCormick, Evidence 116 (2d ed. 1972). All 
grounds for objection should be specified at the 
time the objection is made. "The general rule re-
garding specific objections is that one who has . 
made specific objections to the admission of evi-
dence thereby waives all other objections and can-
not assert such other grounds in the appellate 
court." Johnson v. English, 5 App(2d) 109, 113, 214 
N E(2d) 254, 257 (1966). 
Offers of Proof 
When evidence has been excluded by a ruling of 
the trial judge, Rule 103(A)(2) requires an offer of 
proof. In Pokorny v. Local 310, 35 App(2d) 178, 300 
N E(2d) 464 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 38 
OS(2d) 177, 311 NE(2d) 866 (1974), the court held: 
"When a court sustains objections to a question a 
statement must be made or proffered as to what 
the expected answer would be in order that a re-
viewing court can determine whether or not the ac-
tion of the trial court is prejudicial; and in the ab-
sence of a proffer, the exclusion of evidence may 
not be assigned as error." !d. at 184; 300 N E(2d) at 
468-69. 
An offer of proof may take several forms. An 
offer of testimonial evidence typically takes the 
form of a statement by counsel as to the content 
of the expected testimony. The court, however, 
may require or be asked to take the "offer" by an 
examination of the witness, including cross-
examination. See Rule 103(8) (court "may direct 
the making of an offer in question and answer 
form"). Excluded documentary evidence should be 
marked for identification and appended to the rec-
ord of trial. 
There are several exceptions to the offer of proof 
requirement. First, an offer is not necessary when 
the substance of the excluded evidence is "appar-
ent from the context .... " Second, unlike Federal 
Rule 103, Rule 103(A)(2) provides that an offer of 
proof is not required if evidence is excluded during 
cross-examination. See Burt v. State, 23 OS 394 
(1872); State v. Debo, 8 App(2d) 325, 222 NE(2d) 656 
(1966). Finally, the offer of proof requirement is 
subject to the plain error doctrine. 
Hearing of Jury 
Rule 103(C) requires discussions involving the 
admissibility of evidence to be held outside the 
hearing of the jury whenever practicable. Rule 
104(C) contains a similar provision. The trial judge 
has discretion to require either a side-bar confer-
ence or an out-of-court hearing. In addition, eviden-
tiary issues may be raised prior to trial either at a 
pretrial conference, see Grim. R. 17.1, or by means 
of a motion in limine. 
Although not specifically mentioned by the 
Rules of Evidence, motions in limine have often 
been used to resolve evidentiary issues. See 
United States v. Cook, 608 F(2d) 1175 (9th Cir. 
1979); United States v. Oakes, 565 F( 2d) 170 (1st 
Cir. 1977); C. McCormick, Evidence 17 (2d ed. 1978 
Supp.); Annat., 63 A.L.R.3d 311 (1975). 
In State v. Spahr, 47 App(2d) 221, 353 NE(2d) 624 
(1976), the court commented on the use of motions 
in limine: 
There is no provision under the rules or the statutes 
for a motion in limine. The request was no more and 
no less than an appeal to the trial court for a precau-
tionary instruction to opposing counsel to avoid error 
or prejudice, such instruction to be effective until ad-
missibility was resolved. Such a request lies in the in-
herent power and discretion of the trial judge to con-
trol the proceedings. /d. at 224, 353 NE(2d) at 626-27. 
The trial court's authority to consider motions in 
limine under the Rules of Evidence is found in 
Rule 611(A), which recognizes the court's general 
authority to control the presentation of evidence. 
Motions in limine should be distinguished from 
motions to suppress. Suppression motions are 
governed by Criminal Rule 12(B)(3) and are gener-
ally required to be made prior to trial. 
Plain Error 
Rule 103(D) recognizes the plain error doctrine, 
under which an appellate court may consider an 
evidentiary error even though a party has failed to 
make an objection, a motion to strike, or an offer 
of proof at trial. The purpose of the plain error doc-
trine is to "safeguard the right of a defendant to a 
fair trial, notwithstanding his failure object in time-
ly fashion to error at that trial." State v. Valery, 46 
OS(2d) 316, 327, 348 N E(2d) 351, 359 (1979), cert. 
denied, 429 US 932 (1976). Criminal Rule 52(B) 
specifically recognizes the plain error doctrine in 
criminal cases; it provides: "Plain error or defects 
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affecting substantial rights may be noticed 
although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court." 
The plain error rule only applies to errors affect-
ing substantial rights. In State v. Craft, 52 App(2d) 
1, 367 N E(2d) 1221 (1977), the court offered the fol-
lowing definition of plain error: 
[O]bvious error prejudicial to a defendant, ... which in-
volves a matter of great public interest having sub-
stantial adverse impact on the integrity of and the 
public's confidence in judicial proceedings. The error 
must be obvious on the records, palpable, and funda-
mental, and in addition it must occur in exceptional 
circumstances where the appellate court acts in the 
public interest because the error affects "the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceeding." 
/d. at 7, 367 NE{2d) at 1225-26. 
RULE 104: PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 
Rule 104 governs preliminary questions relating 
to the admissibility of evidence. The rule generally 
follows prior Ohio law. The concept of conditional 
relevancy recognized in Rule 104(B), however, is 
new. 
Rule 104(A) follows the traditional practice of al-
locating to the trial judge the responsibility for rul-
ing on the admissibility of evidence. See Potter v. 
Baker, 162 OS 488, 500, 124 NE(2d) 140, 146 (1955) 
("It is elementary that the trial judge is to decide 
those questions of fact which must be decided in 
order to determine whether certain evidence is ad-
missible."). Rule 104(B), however, carves out an ex-
ception for preliminary questions involving issues 
of conditional relevancy. 
Pursuant to Rule 104(A), the trial judge decides 
as a preliminary matter the "qualification of a per-
son to be a witness," including the competency of 
witnesses under Rule 601 and the qualifications of 
experts under Rule 702. The judge also decides the 
"existence of a privilege" under Rule 501. Finally, 
the judge decides as a preliminary matter the "ad-
missibility of evidence" - for example, whether a 
statement is hearsay, Rule 801, and if an exception 
to the hearsay rule applies, Rules 803 and 804. 
According to Rule 104(A), the trial judge, when 
ruling on the admissibility of evidence, is "not 
bound by the rules of evidence except those with 
respect to privileges." A similar provision is found 
in Rule 101(C)(1). See generally United States v. 
Matlock, 415 US 164, 172-73 (1974) ("[T]he rules of 
evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do 
not operate with full force at hearings before the 
judge to determine the admissibility of evidence."); 
C. McCormick, Evidence§ 53(2d ed. 1972). 
The principal controversy concerning Federal 
Rule 104 has involved its application when a trial 
court is required to determine as a preliminary 
matter the existence of a conspiracy in deciding 
the admissibility of coconspirator's statements. 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). In other words, can the 
judge consider the statement itself in determining 
whether or not a conspiracy exists? This issue has 
been resolved in the Ohio Rules of Evidence. Rule 
801(D)(2)(e) requires "independent proof of the 
conspiracy." 
Conditional Relevancy 
Rule 104(B), governing preliminary questions of 
conditional relevancy, operates as an exception to 
Rule 104(A). The drafters of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence explained conditional relevancy as 
follows: 
In some situations, the relevancy of an item of evi-
dence, in the large sense, depends upon the existence 
of a particular preliminary fact. Thus when a spoken 
statement is relied upon to prove notice to X, it is 
without probative value unless X heard it. Or if a letter 
purporting to be from Y is relied upon to establish an 
admission by him, it has no probative value unless Y 
wrote or authorized it. Relevance in this sense has 
been labeled "conditional relevancy." Advisory Com-
mittee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 104. 
If a preliminary question involves an issue of 
conditional relevancy, the trial judge's function is 
limited. He does not decide such questions exclu-
sively or with finality, as is the case with prelimi-
nary questions under Rule 104(A). Rather, the trial 
judge determines only if sufficient evidence has 
been introduced "to support a finding of the fulfill-
ment of the condition." If this standard is satis-
fied, the evidence is admitted for the jury's 
consideration. 
Rule 104(B) is a provision of general applicabil-
ity. Several specific rules represent specialized ap-
plications of the concept of conditional relevancy. 
For example, in applying the firsthand knowledge 
rule, the trial judge does not decide whether or not 
a witness has firsthand knowledge; he decides only 
whether sufficient evidence has been introduced 
"to support a finding that [the witness) has per-
sonal knowledge of the matter." Rule 602. Simi-
larly, when ruling on the authentication of a docu-
ment, the trial judge does not decide whether the 
proffered document is genuine or not; his decision 
is limited to determining whether there is "evi-
dence sufficient to support a finding that the mat-
ter in question is what its proponent claims." Rule 
,--901(A). See also Rule 1008. 
Hearing of the Jury 
Rule 104(C), requiring the court to hold an out-of-
- court hearing when ruling on the admissibility of a 
confession, is constitutionally mandated as a re-
sult of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
Jackson v. Denno, 378 US 368 (1964). See also 
State v. Wigglesworth, 18 OS(2d) 171, 248 NE(2d) 
607 (1969). This provision should be invoked rarely 
because Criminal Rule 12(B)(3) requires the admis-
sibility of confessions, which are challenged on 
constitutional grounds, to be raised prior to trial by 
a motion to suppress. Rule 104(C) also provides 
that hearings "on other preliminary matters shall 
be conducted out of the hearing of the jury when 
the interests of justice require." A similar provision 
is found in Rule 103(C). 
Testimony by the Accused 
Rule 104(0) limits the scope of cross-examina-
tion when a criminal defendant testifies on a pre-
liminary matter. A specific rule on cross-
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examination on preliminary matters was consid-
ered necessary because Rule 611(B) adopts the 
wide-open rule on scope of cross-examination in 
all other proceedings. 
As both the Ohio Staff Note and federal Advi-
sory Committee's Note indicate, Rule 104(C) does 
not address the issue of whether the accused's 
testimony on a preliminary matter can be subse-
quently used at trial. Both the Ohio and federal 
notes cite several decisions by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. In Simmons v. United States, 390 US 377 
(1968), the Court held that testimony given by a de-
fendant during a suppression hearing in order to 
establish standing to object to illegally seized evi-
dence could not be used against the defendant at 
trial on the issue of guilt. Whether the Simmons 
rule extends to the impeachment use of suppres-
sion hearing testimony has not yet been decided 
by the Court. The Court specifically reserved that 
question in United States v. Salvucci, 100 S Ct 
2547 (1980). 
In Harris v. New York, 401 US 222 (1971), the 
Court held that statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda could be used to impeach a defendant at 
trial. See also Oregon v. Haas, 420 US 714 (1975). 
Similarly, the Court has permitted the impeach-
ment use of evidence seized in violation of Fourth 
Amendment rights. United States v. Havens, 100 S 
Ct 1912 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 US 62 
(1954). 
Weight and Credibility 
Rule 1 04(E) concerns the right of a party to intro-
duce evidence relevant to weight and credibility. 
The purpose of this provision is to make clear that 
a court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence 
does not curtail the right of a party to dispute the 
reliability of admitted evidence before the jury. For 
example, if the court determines, as a matter of 
constitutional law, that a confession is voluntary, 
the defendant may nevertheless introduce before 
the jury evidence challenging the reliability of the 
confession. See State v. Wigglesworth, 18 OS(2d) 
171, 248 N E(2d) 607 (1969). 
RULE 105: LIMITED ADMISSIBiliTY 
Rule 105 recognizes the principle of limited ad-
missibility. An item of evidence may be admissible 
if offered for one purpose but inadmissible if of-
fered for another purpose. Evidence also may be 
admissible against one party, but not against an-
other party. In such cases Rule 105 applies and the 
court, upon request, is required to instruct the jury 
as to the limited purpose of the evidence. The rule 
does not preclude the trial judge from giving such 
a limiting instruction sua sponte. See generally 4 
Ohio Jury Instructions§ 402.60 (1970) (limited pur-
pose evidence). 
A limiting instruction could be given either at 
the time the evidence is admitted or at the close 
of the case. The prior Ohio cases provide little 
guidance. In Barnett v. State, 104 OS 298, 135 NE 
647 (1922), the Supreme Court held that a limiting 
instruction could be given at the time of admission 
or in the general charge. In Brewing Co. v. Bauer, 
50 OS 560, 35 NE 55 (1893), the Court required the 
instruction to be given at the time the evidence 
was received. The language of Rule 105 would 
seem to require the instruction be given at the. 
time the evidence is introduced. But see United 
States v. Weil, 561 F(2d) 1109, 1111 (4th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Papia, 560 F(2d) 827, 839-40 (7th 
Cir. 1977). 
The failure of a party to request a limiting in-
struction has been held to cbnstitute a waiver. See 
Alger v. Schine Theatrical Co., 59 App. 68, 17 
NE(2d) 118 (1938). Not all the Ohio cases, however, 
have applied the waiver rule. See Kroger Co. v. 
McCarty, 111 App. 362, 172 NE(2d) 463 (1960). A 
failure to request a limiting instruction should be 
considered a waiver, except in those instances in 
which the plain error rule applies, Rule 103(0). See 
United States v. Vitale, 596 F(2d) 688, 689 (5th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 US 868 (1979); United 
States v. Sangrey, 586 F(2d) 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 
1978). 
Evidence Admissible for One Purpose 
There are numerous situations in which an item 
of evidence may be admissible if offered for one 
purpose, but inadmissible if offered for another 
purpose. In some instances, the Rules of Evidence 
specifically refer to this possibility. For example, 
Rule 404(B) provides that evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts may be admissible for a number of 
purposes, including proof of niotive, opportunity, 
intent, or identity. Such evidence, however, "is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity there-
with." An instruction limiting such evidence to its 
proper purpose is appropriate. See 4 Ohio Jury In-
structions § 405.23 (1974) (Provisional). 
In many cases, however, the Rules of Evidence 
do not expressly refer to the doctrine of limited ad-
missibility. Nevertheless, the doctrine applies. For 
example, evidence of prior convictions typically is 
admissible only for impeachment. See Rule 609. 
Such evidence, however, could also be used as 
character evidence, especially if the witness is the 
accused. This latter use of prior conviction evi-
dence is prohibited by Rule 404(A). An instruction 
limiting the use of this type of evidence is appro-
priate. See 4 Ohio Jury Instructions § 402.60 (1970); 
4 /d. § 405.22 (1974} (Provisional). 
Evidence Admissible Against One Party 
An item of evidence may be admissible against 
one party, but not against another party. In such a 
case, a limiting instruction directing the jury to 
use the evidence against the proper party must be 
given, upon request, pursuant to Rule 105. See 
also 4 Ohio Jury Instructions § 405.40 (1974) (Provi-
sional) (several defendants); Webb v. Grimm, 116 
App 63, 186 NE(2d) 739 (1961). 
Most of the problems relating to this issue have 
involved joint trials in criminal cases. In Bruton v. 
United States, 391 US 123 (1968), the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that an instruction limiting the use in a 
8 
joint trial of the confession of one defendant 
which implicated a codefendant was insufficiant 
to protect against the improper jury use of the con-
fession. Once the Court concluded that there ex-
isted a substantial risk that the jury, despite the 
cautionary instruction to the contrary, looked to 
the incriminating extrajudicial statements in deter-
mining the petitioner's guilt, it ruled that the de-
fendant had been denied his Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation because his right to cross-
examine the codefendant about the statement had 
been foreclosed. In subsequent decisions, the 
Court held Bruton applicable to the state trials, 
Roberts v. Russell, 392 US 293 (1968), and subject 
to the harmless error doctrine, Harrington v. Cali-
fornia, 395 US 250 (1969). 
There are several ways in which the Bruton 
issue can be obviated. First, separate trials avoid 
the problem raised in Bruton. If the codefendants 
have been properly joined for trial under Criminal 
Rule 8(B), the proper remedy is a motion to sever 
for prejudice pursuant to Criminal Rules 12(B)(5) 
and 14. The trial judge has discretion to grant such 
a motion. If the codefendants have been improper-
ly joined under Criminal Rule 8(B}, the proper 
remedy is a motion for severance for misjoinder 
pursuant to Criminal Rules 8 and 12(B)(2). In such 
cases, the defendant need not show prejudice and 
the trial judge must sever. Second, the prosecution 
can delete (redact) all references in the confession 
relating to the codefendant. Bruton, supra at 134 n. 
10; State v. Rosen, 151 OS 339, 342, 86 NE(2d) 24, 
26 (1949). Redaction, however, is not always 
effective. 
Third, the Bruton problem can be avoided, at 
least in some instances, if the codefendant testi-
fies at trial. Under these circumstances the de-
fendant would have the opportunity to cross-
examine the codefendant on the accuracy of the 
out-of-court statement, thereby obviating the con-
frontation issue. The U.S. Supreme Court took this 
position in Nelson v. O'Neill, 402 US 622 (1971): 
"We conclude that where a codefendant takesthe 
stand in his own defense, denies making an al-
leged out-of-court statement implicating the de-
fendant, and proceeds to testify favorable to the 
defendant concerning the underlying facts, the de· 
fendant has been denied no rights protected by 
the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." /d. at 629-30. See also State v. Doherty, 56 
App(2d) 112, 381 NE(2d) 960 (1978). 
Fourth, there is some authority for the proposi-
tion that Bruton is inapplicable when both defend-
ants have confessed, implicating each other (inter· 
locking confessions). The U.S. Supreme Court con· 
sidered, but did not resolve, this issue in Parker v. 
Randolph, 442 US 62 (1979). The plurality opinion ir 
Parker adopted the position that Bruton was not 
applicable to cases involving interlocking confes-
sions. Only four Justices, however, joined in that 
opinion and other courts have taken the contrary 
position. See Hodges v. Rose, 570 F(2d) 643 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied 436 US 909 (1978); United States 
v. DiGilio, 538 F(2d) 972 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied 
429 us 1038 (1977). 
RULE 106: REMAINDER OF A WRITING 
Rule 106 codifies the rule of completeness. 
When one party introduces a document, a recorded 
statement, or parts thereof, the opposing party 
may immediately introduce the entire document or 
recorded statement, parts thereof, or related 
documents or statements, if fairness so requires. 
In most trial situations, a party wishing to put the 
opposing party's evidence in context must wait un-
til cross-examination or the next stage of trial in 
which that party is permitted to introduce 
evidence. Rule 106 carves out a special exception 
for documents and recorded statements; with 
documents or recorded statement a party is per-
mitted to place the opposing party's evidence "in 
context" immediately. A similar provision, govern-
ing the admission of depositions at trial, is found 
in Criminal Rule 15(F): "If only part of a deposition 
is offered in evidence by a party, any party may 
offer other parts." 
There are few Ohio cases on the rule of com-
pleteness. In Industrial Comm'n of Ohio v. Link, 34 
App 174, 170 NE 594 (1929), however, the court 
commented: "It is a well-known rule of evidence 
that, when a part of a document is offered in evi-
dence by either side, the opposing side may call 
for the entire contents of the document." /d. at 
182, 170 NEat 596. 
Rule 105 does not govern conversations. If a 
party wishes to elicit additional parts of a conver-
sation in order to put the conversation in context, 
he must wait until a later stage in the proceeding 
- typically, cross-examination. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Stop and Frisk 
Undercover officers purchased marijuana from a 
friend of the defendant. The defendant was pres-
-=--ent but did not participate in the sale. After arrest-
ing the friend, the police frisked the defendant and 
discovered a cylindrical object, which they sus-
pected contained marijuana. The Court held that 
the search was a legitimate stop and frisk pro-
cedure. Because the defendant was a friend of the 
suspect and presumably knew that the friend was 
selling drugs, the police could reasonably frisk the 
defendant to assure their own safety. Since, how-
. ever, the police testified that they did not believe 
the object was a weapon, the warrantless seizure 
of suspected contraband was illegal. Dunn v. 
; State, 27 Grim. L-: Rptr. 2099 (Fla. App. 1980) 
Expert Testimony - Confrontation 
..... In the defendant's trial for possession of narcot-
~<;Jcs, a forensic toxicologist testified as to the nar-
. cotic nature of the substance in question. The ex-
~-pert, however, based his opinion on the test re-
'~;sults of two other experts who had conducted the 
~~J~xamination, but who did not testify. The court 
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ruled that where the testimony of the expert was 
so crucial to the prosecution's case, and where the 
prosecution did not make a showing that the ex-
perts who conducted the tests were unavailable 
for trial, the testimony denied the defendant the 
right to confrontation. Reardon v. Manson, 27 Grim. 
L. Rptr. 2148 (D.C. Conn., 1980) 
Plea Bargain Statements 
Under Federal Criminal Rule 11(e)(6) (See also 
Ohio Evid. R. 410) a statement made by a defend-
ant in connection with an offer to plead guilty is 
inadmissible. An F.B.I. agent had been authorized 
to offer the defendant a deal to a Jesser charge if 
he would assist in the government probe of a kick-
back scheme. Although the defendant never ac-
tually entered a plea, his actions at the time in-
dicated that he intended to accept the offer and 
enter a plea. Under these facts any statement 
made by him to the F.B.I. agent, authorized by the 
prosecution to negotiate the deal, was not ad-
missible against him at trial. U.S. v. Grant, 27 Grim. 
L. Rptr. 2190 (8th Cir. 1980) 
Confessions 
During the course of a 6-hour interrogation the 
police obtained a confession by misrepresenting 
the strength of the evidence against the defendant 
and by telling him that his confession would result 
in greater leniency. The police tactics also in-
cluded repeated statements that they believed the 
defendant was not a bad man, that he needed 
treatment for his problem, and that if he cooper-
ated by confessing, he would receive such treat-
ment at a nice hospital. Relying primarily on Bram 
v. U.S., 168 US 532 (1897), the Court ruled that a 
confession obtained "by any direct or implied 
promises, however slight (or by] the exertion of im-
proper influence" is involuntary and inadmissible. 
People v. Bay, 27 Grim. L Rptr. 2461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 
App. Div. 1980) 
Installation of Pen Register 
The plaintiff sought a writ of prohibition to pre-
vent the defendant, a judge, from proceeding with 
a contempt hearing to enforce an order requiring 
the plaintiff to aid in the installation of a pen 
register on the phone of a suspected gambler. In 
affirming the judge's authority to make such an 
order, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that under 
Ohio Grim. R. 41(b), a judge may order the seizure 
of "evidence of the commission of a criminal of-
fense." The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted a com-
parable federal rule in U.S. v. New York Telephone 
Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), and reached the same re-
sult. Also, under the authority of Zurcher v. Stan-
ford Daily, 436 US 547 (1979), a judge has the 
authority to order the search of third party prem-
ises for evidence of the commission of a crime. 
Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Williams, 63 OS(2d) 51, 
407 N E(2d) 2 (1980) 
Grand Jury - Juveniles 
Because one of the general policies of Loui-
siana law is "to protect minors from the possible 
consequences of their own immaturity," a grand 
jury cannot compel a minor to testify before it, 
unless he is afforded the right to counsel. More-
over, counsel may accompany minors into the 
grand jury room. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 
(Graham), 27 Grim. L. Rptr. 2346 (La. 1980) 
Statistical Evidence 
The Court expressed its hostility to the use of 
statistics to explain to the jury the possibility of a 
misidentification based upon an expert's testi-
mony. In the case, the critical link between the de-
fendant and the crime was the scientific identifica-
tion of several hairs found in a ski mask. In final 
argument, the prosecutor used the expert witness' 
estimate of the likelihood that two different per-
sons' hair could be indistinguishable (one chance 
in a thousand) to argue that the identification was 
made beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held 
that it was plain error for the prosecutor to equate 
the probability of concurrence of identifying marks 
with the probability of a misidentification, thus de-
fining reasonable doubt by statistical probabilities. 
U.S. v. Massey, 25 Grim. L. Rptr. 2049 (8th Cir. 
1979). 
Automobile Inventory Searches 
The need to protect property located inside a 
vehicle is a constitutionally valid rationale for a 
routine, noninvestigative warrantless inventory 
search of a car and its contents. In impounding a 
vehicle, the police may catalog all articles that are 
not in closed or sealed containers. As to closed 
containers, the officer should not open them, but 
should merely list them as closed or locked pack-
ages, briefcases or containers. The Alaska Su-
preme Court stated that "inventory procedures 
thus limited constitute only minimal intrusions 
upon an owner's reasonable expectation of privacy 
and are thus constitutionally permissible in light of 
the rationales underlying police inventory searches 
of impounded vehicles and .a.Jaska's constitutional 
guarantee against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures." In this case, evidence found after police 
opened the defendant's briefcase, located in his 
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car, during an inventory search was correctly sup-
pressed. State v. Daniel, 24 Grim. L. Rptr. 2390 
(Alaska Sup. Ct. 1979). 
Confrontation - Sentencing Stage 
During the sentencing stage of a parolee's state 
trial for capital murder, the trial court admitted let-
ters and reports containing double hearsay unfa-
vorable to the parolee. The Court held that the ad-
mission of hearsay by unidentified and possibly 
unqualified declarants violated the parolee's Sixth 
Amendment rights to confrontation and cross-ex-
amination. Although the material might have been 
admissible under the statute, the Court held that 
the documents were not reliable enough to meet 
Sixth Amendment requirements. The Court noted 
that the trial court's discretion in the admission of 
evidence goes only to the relevance of the facts 
sought to be proved and not to the manner of 
proof. Porter v. State, 25 Grim. L. Rptr. 2100 (Tex. 
Ct. Grim. App. 1979). 
Identification - Burden of Proof 
The Maine Supreme Court has established bur-
den of proof requirements for the admission of 
identification evidence. "[W]e hold that once a de-
fendant, as the movant in the suppression hearing 
required by State v. Boyd, 294 A.2d 459 (1972), 
proves by a preponderance that a pretrial identifi-
cation procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, 
the burden shifts to the State to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the corrupting effect of 
the suggestive procedure is outweighed by the reli 
ability of the identification as set forth in Neil v. 
Biggers, [409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)]." State v. 
Cefalo. 24 Grim. L. Rptr. 2424 (Maihe Sup. Jud. Ct. 
1979). 
Testimony From a Probation Revocation Hearing 
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the tes 
timony of a probationer at a revocation hearing is 
inadmissible as evidence against him at a later 
trial on related criminal charges, except for pur-
poses of impeachment or rebuttal. Since U.S. Su-
preme Court cases give no clear answer to the 
constitutional questions involved, the Court based 
its holding on public policy grounds. People v. 
Rocha, 24 Grim. L. Rptr. 2354 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978). 
